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ABSTRACT 
This article analyzes the Kurdish conflict in terms of the theories and
practices of conflict resolution. The low-intensity conflict in Turkey
is used for the application of conflict resolution theories, namely
basic human needs (BHNs), dissonance (relative deprivation), real-
ist, psychodynamic, and chaos theories to explain and understand
deep-rooted and protracted intra-state conflicts. Before analyzing
the conflict with an interdisciplinary approach and different theories,
the historical background is presented. The psychodynamic
approach (externalization, projection, chosen traumas, dehumaniza-
tion, the egoism of victimization, the need for the enemies and allies,
and the ethnic identity formation) are necessary to explain the
Kurdish question in Turkey in the post-11 September world order.
With the help of conflict resolution tools, the author analyzes the use
of interactive problem-solving workshop (PSWs) to find a common
ground between Turks and Kurds. The article concludes that the con-
flict should be explained and understood not only within the context
of terrorism and economic backwardness, but also identity and basic
human security needs of the conflicting parties. It also requires using
both military and conflict resolution tools.   
INTRODUCTION
The Kurdish question is the main source of political instability in Turkey
today and has become the biggest challenge to the existence of the Turkish
republic since its creation in 1923. The Kurdish question affects practically all of
Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. Its annual expense — estimated at some
$6 billion per year (1998) — is one of the main reasons for the weakness of the
Turkish economy. It also impacts negatively on the economy by affecting
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tourism, direct foreign investments, and foreign credits. Politically, the Kurdish
question hinders the improvement of democracy and human rights, and it helps
to strengthen the perception of hard security issues in Turkish politics. Moreover,
the more hardliners pursue a military solution, the more Kurdish elements in
Turkish society become alienated.  Also, the Kurdish question limits Turkish for-
eign policy. It not only creates tense relations between Turkey and its neighbors,
but also impedes Turkish entrance to the European Union. In the end, it threat-
ens Turkey’s territorial integrity and creates political instability in the Middle
East. 
There are many different approaches to defining the Kurdish question.
First, the Kurdish question is basically seen as external and internal terrorism that
becomes a military and foreign policy issue. Second, it is perceived as an eco-
nomic inequality, underdevelopment, and unemployment issue that leads to vio-
lent, low-intensity conflict. Last, it is, in fact, more an ethnic and identity con-
flict than terrorism and economic hardship. Turkish policy makers and public
opinion at large believe the Turkish state discourse that is based on the homoge-
nous “Turkish” identity and rejects the idea that there is a separate Kurdish iden-
tity.1 In a dynamic process, both the Kurdish and Turkish identity have been
changed over time and are likely to change further in the future depending on
events. 
First, I will highlight the historical factors in the Kurdish question and give
an overall explanation of events up until now. In the next section, I will employ
three conflict theories to shed light on the Kurdish question. The theories consist
of basic human needs (BHNs), dissonance, international/realist theories, and
psychodynamic and chaos theories. In the following section, I will focus on the
problem-solving workshops that may help to find a peaceful solution to the
Kurdish question. In the end, the article will examine the possible solutions for
political stability and peaceful coexistence in Turkey. 
The Kurdish conflict cannot be explained only with realist theory that pres-
ents it as a conflict between the Turkish state and PKK. It is argued here that
basic human needs, relative deprivation, psychodynamic, and chaos theories
must also receive adequate attention for a multi-level analysis of the conflict and
that conflict intervention has to include track-1, track-2, and multi-track
approaches.
ORIGINS OF THE KURDISH QUESTION
The majority of Kurds are probably descended from waves of Indo-
European tribes and Kurds assume that their ancestors are Medes. The estimated
number of the Kurds is probably 20 to 25 million people, living largely in four
Middle East countries: Turkey (10-12 million); Iran (5 to 6 million); Iraq (3.5
million), and Syria (1 million).2 However, this number has varied for Turkey.
David McDowall has estimated that 19 percent of the people in Turkey are
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Kurds.3 One of the recent studies based on the 1965 census in which people were
asked to identify their mother tongues concluded that the Kurds represent 12.6
percent of the population (that is equal to 7 million in 1990).4 Because of immi-
gration, only 5 million Kurds live in the southeastern part of Turkey where the
violent conflict has been taking place between the Turkish government and
Kurdish terrorist organization, PKK (Partiya Karkiya Kurdiya [Kurdish Workers
Party]). The others are mainly located in large cities like Istanbul and Izmir and
near the region of Mersin and Adana.5 They speak two dialects: Kurmanji and
Surani, which are related to Persian. Approximately 75 percent of Kurds in
Turkey follow the Sunni Islamic faith. The others are mostly Alevi and mainly
live in Tunceli.6
During the period of the Ottoman Empire, Kurds enjoyed a quasi-
autonomous status in this region. However, they were never recognized as a
minority because of the Ottoman millet system.7 Both Turks and Kurds, togeth-
er with other Muslim groups in the Ottoman Empire, shared the same privilege
of belonging to the larger Muslim community (umma). Apart from the Christian
minority, they formed the Muslim core of the empire. The Kurdish feudal lords
and leaders (aghas and sheikhs)8 perceived themselves “as Sunni Muslim sub-
jects of a fundamentally Islamic empire.”9 Hence, the Kurdish lords and leaders
fought against the French army in Egypt, whom they saw as Christian infidels.
Interestingly, Abdulhamid II created the special Hamidiye regiments of Kurdish
officers and soldiers to use against the Armenians between 1905 and 1908.10
Although the primary ethnic distinction between the Kurds and Turks in
Turkey is based on language, strong tribal identity among the Kurds is also a sig-
nificant factor working against ethnic unity. It is crucial to understand that the
Kurdish insurrections against the Ottoman state throughout the nineteenth centu-
ry were the result of tribal rivalry and tribal leaders’ aspiration for more freedom
and independence in their region. Also, the modernization and centralization of
the Ottoman administration, and extension of state rule into the Kurdish inhabit-
ed areas triggered a number of revolts in the same period. 
After the first and second Constitutional period in the Ottoman Empire
(1876-1908), the Kurdish intelligentsia began a cultural movement. The first
journal in Kurdish was published and the Kurdish elite organized around soci-
eties. After the First World War, the Kurds were invited to the Sèvres Conference
where the Allies partitioned the Ottoman Empire. The Sèvres Treaty in 1920
“envisaged interim autonomy for the predominantly Kurdish areas of Turkey
with a view to full independence if the inhabitants of these areas wanted this.”11
However, Mustafa Kemal led the War of Independence against all these occu-
pants in order to create a new and independent Turkish republic. It is astonishing
that the Kurds fought together with the Turks against the Great Powers during
this period.
After Turkey’s independence in 1923, a brief opportunity arose to create a
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bi-national or nation-state with a recognized and distinct Kurdish minority.
However, the unitary and secularist Kemalist ideology was followed in creating
the founding principles of the Republic of Turkey and had an enormous effect on
the formation of Turkish nationalism and identity. First, the minorities were
defined in religious terms as documented in the Lausanne Treaty. Therefore, only
non-Muslim populations – Armenians, Greeks, and Jews – were accorded the
special minority and cultural rights. Second, the republic adopted a civic and ter-
ritorially determined national identity; however, it emphasized the “Turks” as an
ethnic category. During this state-building and nation-building period, the fun-
damental tenet was that Turkish nationalism was based on the Turkish language
and “Turkishness.” One of Mustafa Kemal’s most famous phrases captured
Turkish nationalism: “Happy is one who can say one is a Turk.”  With this
emphasis on secularism and Turkish ethnic identity, the Kemalist ideology
expected that the Kurds would reject their identity. With the help of moderniza-
tion and Turkification of the language, the key Turkish elites from the profes-
sional intelligentsia to the military officer class sought to create a modern, secu-
lar, and united Turkish state. In this new Turkish state, Kurds could qualify as
“Turks,” only if they denied their own ethnic identity. Since then, there have been
two potential threats to the integrity of the modern state: Kurdish separatism and
religious fundamentalism.12
The 1920s and 1930s witnessed education and secularization reforms
imposed by the intellectual and military elites. During this period, 18 revolts
occurred in eastern Anatolia and 16 took place in mostly Kurdish populated
regions.13 Among them, three were important: the revolts of Sheikh Said in 1925,
Agri (Ararat) from 1926-30, and Dersim (Tunceli) in 1937. Even though most
scholars believe that the 1925 Sheikh Said revolt was caused by a mix of Kurdish
nationalist and religious sentiments, the last two revolts were semi-nationalist,
but they were all regionally-bound. In addition to the execution of the leaders of
the revolts, the Kurdish language and the expression of Kurdish identity were
severely banned. Almost all of the Kurdish population of the Dersim area was
forcibly deported to the western part of Turkey.14 Moreover, references to the
Kurds were not allowed in the east, and eventually the use of the word “Kurd”
disappeared from media, official documentation, and school textbooks. The
Kurds were officially declared to be “Mountain Turks.”15
The rebirth of the Kurdish identity only occurred at the start of the 1950s
with the transition to multiparty rule. Migration to the towns, loosening of tradi-
tional ties, and increased opportunities for schooling and higher education led to
the growth of a new group of Kurdish intelligentsia. Also, the political and eco-
nomic liberalization and democratization provided a new phase in the cultural
and political realm for the Kurdish movement. First, the Kurdish elites started a
revival of Kurdish ethnic identity that encompassed both popular forms of
expression and intellectual activity that engaged in new publishing activity in a
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unified Kurdish language. Second, this new movement allied itself with the left-
wing movement in Turkish politics. The new Kurdish leaders joined the Turkish
Labor Party (TLP) which became the first party to recognize openly that “there
is a Kurdish people living in eastern Turkey.”16 The main emphasis, however,
was on the economic identification of the Kurdish question and imperialistic
exploitation of “eastern Turkey” in alliance with the collaborating native classes.
As Hamit Bozarslan indicated, “the demands were more concerned with integra-
tion than separation.”17
The Post-Cold War Development of the Kurdish Question in Turkey
In the 1980s, Kurdish nationalism first found expression within the mili-
tary realm and then moved into cultural and political fields. Four factors con-
tributed to this resurgence of the Kurdish movement. First, the military regime
initiated some of its most regressive and repressive policies toward the Kurds,
including a broadening of language restrictions. Second, the PKK emerged as a
well-organized force that used violence and led to an insurrection. Third, the
Iran-Iraq War caused huge numbers of refugees to move toward Turkey. This
attracted media attention and made it difficult to ignore the large Kurdish pres-
ence in Turkey. Moreover, structural change within the international system dur-
ing the post-Cold War era caused the revival of ethnic identities all over the
world. Finally, the creation of a quasi-autonomous Kurdish enclave in northern
Iraq is seen in Turkey as a model its own Kurds may want to imitate and a poten-
tial threat to Turkey’s territorial sovereignty.18
The PKK was formed in 1978 although its origins go back to a faction
within the Turkish Marxist-Leninist terrorist group, Dev-Genc (the Turkish
Federation of Revolutionary Youth of Turkey). Its first attack took place in 1984
in the towns of Semdinli and Eruh in  southeast Turkey, where most of the coun-
try’s Kurds live. PKK’s ideological platform was based largely on separatist
nationalism. The leader of PKK, Ocalan, mostly stressed a federalist solution
(Turkish-Kurdish, Arab-Kurdish in Iraq, and Persian-Kurdish in Iran) in the
Middle East, which necessitated re-structuring in three major states.19 However,
in the last resort Kurdish ethnonationalism aimed to create a unified Kurdistan
that includes four Middle Eastern countries. 
Since 1984, Kurdish ethnonationalism has posed a threat to the existence
of the Turkish state. Its nationalist demands range from cultural recognition of
distinctiveness to outright separation. The Turkish army fought a low-intensity
war in the southeast of Turkey against the PKK. In addition to a death toll of
30,00020 people during the conflict, the Kurdish question also posed a great
threat to the future stability and territorial integrity of Turkey. Moreover, the
Kurdish insurgency has resulted in crippling the economy in Turkey.21 Apart
from this political cost, the Kurdish question is the most important impediment
to Turkey becoming a full member of the European Union. Moreover, the dead-
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ly and violent character of the conflict put Turkey in a difficult human rights
position in its relations with its neighbors and the United States.
Post-11 September World and the Kurdish Question
In February 1999, a turning point in the Kurdish conflict took place when
the PKK leader, Ocalan,  was captured and handed over to Turkish authorities.
His capture led to internal and external changes in Turkish foreign and internal
politics. Internally, the low-intensity conflict had reached its turning point and
de-escalation of the conflict began with a de facto ceasefire. Second, Turkey
signed a new Accession Partnership Agreement in November 2000 that created a
conflict resolution environment, beginning the process of democratization and
the development of human rights, such as positive developments on the use of
the Kurdish language, TV, and radio broadcasting in the Kurdish language, and
freedom to learn the Kurdish language. The Turkish-EU relationship reached a
new stage when the EU decided to open accession negotiations on 17 December
2004. Membership negotiations began on 3 October 2005, and the examination
of the acquis communautaire was opened on 12 October 2006.22 In July 2005,
Prime Minister Erdogan acknowledged past mistakes and the existence of a
Kurdish question. These de-escalatory moves by both sides has ceased with the
intensification of the conflict in Turkey. All of these new developments have
taken place behind the events of 9/11. 
THEORIES, METAPHORS, AND MODELING: THE KURDISH CASE
The Kurdish question in Turkey today is highly complex. Economic,
social, and political (domestic as well as international) factors must be taken into
account. The Kurdish question is also tied to the transformation of Turkey from
a traditional society, where identities were religiously determined at a communal
level, to a modern society, where the aim is to define an individual’s identity at
the state level. In the nation-building and state-building processes, the Kurdish
question shows the failure of nation-building process in Turkey. The moderniza-
tion of society assimilated many Kurds. However, this modernization created a
new and growing Kurdish elite that sought recognition of a separate Kurdish
identity. Although Kemal Kirisci and Gareth Winrow labeled the Kurdish-
Turkish conflict a trans-state ethnic conflict, they still saw that the core of the
problem lies with ethnic identity formation: 
By the 1980s this elite was able to generate a sense of Kurdish iden-
tity among other Kurds. The divisions of the traditional Kurdish
society of the pre-Second World War period were to an extent tran-
scended. This growing awareness of Kurdish identity and the diffi-
culty of the Turkish political system in accommodating it lie at the
heart of the Kurdish question.23
Similarly, in his article, Mesut Yegen explained how the Kurdish question
is reconstituted within the “Turkish State Discourse (TSD) as an issue of either
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political reaction, tribal resistance, or regional backwardness, but never as an
ethno-political question. In TSD, the Kurdish resisters were not Kurds with an
ethno-political cause, but simply Kurdish tribes, Kurdish bandits, Kurdish
sheikhs — all evils of Turkey’s pre-modern past.”24
In order to generate a generic conflict theory, Dennis Sandole proposed to
combine and integrate a “two-culture problem”: “conflict-as-startup conditions
and conflict-as-process.”25 “Conflict-as-startup conditions” generate “conflict-
as-process,”26 and “self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes” come
to characterize the conflict. In conflict resolution theory, the concept of equifi-
nality or multicasuality is an operative concept: “different startup conditions can
lead to the same process.”27
In the following paragraphs, I will draw on five conflict theories for
“explanation and understanding”28 of the Kurdish question in Turkey: basic
human needs, dissonance,  realist theory, and psychodynamic and chaos theories.
It is argued here that these three “paradigmatic” approaches help us to explain
the conflict-as-startup conditions and equifinality (multicasuality) in the Kurdish
question. 
CONFLICT-AS-STARTUP CONDITIONS
Basic Human Needs (BHNs) Theory
Basic human needs (BHNs) theory can be applied to this continuing con-
flict in Turkey. As a founder of BHNs theory, John Burton accepts that there exist
“universal needs, cultural values, and transitory interests.”29 BHNs theory holds
that when individuals’ basic human needs are suppressed and deprived, this caus-
es suffering, abnormal, and deviant behaviors. Individuals strive to satisfy needs
even at the cost of personal disorientation and social disruption. The satisfaction
or deprivation of individual basic human needs is the key source of societal order
and change. There is no consensus about what human needs are. On the one
hand, Maslow differentiates five basic needs, whereas Burton and Johan Galtung
have increased the number of the human needs to nine and twelve, respectively,
and emphasize “security” and “identity” needs.30 Individuals may identify them-
selves with identity groups, such as religious, labor, business, ethnic groups as
well as nation states. The need for identity can be satisfied by arrangements, rec-
ognizing the political autonomy of national and other cultural identity groups.
Galtung defines identity needs as the need for closeness, free from alienation;
they include self-expression, roots, belongingness, etc.31 Values are ideas, habits,
and customs, and they are linguistic, religious, class, ethnic, or other features that
lead to separate cultures and identity groups. The defense of values is important
to the needs of personal security and identity. An attack on cultural values, insti-
tutions, and norms creates conflict in many instances. 
The Kurds’ identity is based on a number of shared characteristics: a com-
mon homeland and culture, a myth of common origins, a shared faith in Islam,
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similar languages, and a history of bitter conflict with outsiders.32 Although
there are some counter arguments about similar language, cultural and language
differences are the main factors of Kurdish ethnic identity.33 Denial of Kurdish
ethnic identity by the majority – Turks – causes frustration and fear on the part
of Kurdish people, while the emphasis on Kurdish identity – defined as autono-
my or an independent state – causes “security” problems for the Turkish state.
Because of their ontological character, these basic human needs are not open to
bargaining. As a result, self-determination is deemed an adequate satisfier of the
need for identity. On the other hand, territorial integrity satisfies security needs.
It is obvious that the oppression of the Kurdish language and culture is the
main reason for conflict in Turkey. For example, Law 2932 declared that the
mother tongue of all Turkish citizens was Turkish. Thousands of Kurdish people
in southeastern part of Turkey do not speak Turkish.  Moreover, the state pro-
hibited giving any names that were not “Turkish.” Fortunately, President Ozal
pushed the Turkish government and parliament to abolish this law and everyone
became free to speak their mother tongues. However, Kurds are still prohibited
from using the Kurdish language in public places, schools, and media. In this
case, language as a value has become an important tool for expressing and enjoy-
ing personal identity. 
Human needs theory may also explain the reason for conflict from the
Turkish perspective. Like the Kurds, Turks have a universal and non-negotiable
need: security. Most Turks think that every activity against the territorial integri-
ty of Turkey must be repressed and eliminated. Many military and civilian lead-
ers claim that giving permission to establish a state in its eastern area can jeop-
ardize the survival of the Turkish state. Also, any “political solution” is seen as
the revival of Sèvres Treaty that partitioned much of Anatolia itself. This psy-
chological chosen trauma34 can be labeled as the “Sèvres syndrome.” Because of
this syndrome, most people begin to accept realities and become prepared for a
long struggle like the situation the British faced with the IRA and the Israelis
with PLO separatists. Moreover, Turkey has many incentives for a united state.
First, the Southeastern Anatolia Project, known by its Turkish acronym, GAP,
which consists of 22 dams and a variety of irrigation projects, has economic,
strategic, and political benefits that would be jeopardized by a Kurdish state.
Second, the eastern part of Turkey connects Europe to the Middle East and the
Central Asia. Finally, the prospective oil pipeline route of Central Asian oil and
gas resources may follow the eastern part of Turkey. 
Dissonance Theory
Another theory that helps us to understand the dispute between the Kurds
and Turks is sociological and psychological theory. Among these dissonance the-
ories, Dennis Sandole lists Galtung’s structural violence or rank disequilibrium,
and Ted Gurr’s relative deprivation (RD) theories.35 According to dissonance
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theory, “violence is a reaction to felt discrepancies between preferred and actual
state of affairs — between our beliefs and values, behavior, and/or environmen-
tal as they actually are and as we think or prefer them to be.”36 Gurr has con-
ceptualized one variation of the structural violence theme: relative deprivation
(RD). This is defined as “a perceived discrepancy between ‘value expectations’
(VE) (resources to which one feels entitled) and ‘value capabilities’ (VC)
(resources which one feels capable of acquiring and keeping).”37 The primary
path to political violence is first, the development of dissatisfaction, second, its
becoming politicized, and finally, resorting to violent actions against political
objectives and actors. Dissatisfaction and discontent derive from the perception
of relative deprivation and is the main factor for collective violence. 
In the Kurdish case, Turkey’s large population (65 million by 1995) and
rapid urbanization exceeded its available economic opportunities. As a result,
relative deprivation became visible in the gecekondus (shantytowns) where the
mostly Kurdish population lives around the western cities of Turkey. Also, the
areas traditionally inhabited by the Kurds have been the least developed parts of
Turkey. In addition, there were large differences in the distribution of wealth as
well as goods and services between the Kurdish and Turkish population. The
eastern and southeastern regions where most Kurds currently live have the low-
est scores for many socio-economic indicators. For example, in 1985 illiteracy
rates of 35.5 and 44.0 percent for these regions were much higher than elsewhere
in Turkey. Similarly, the per capita gross national product (GNP) in the two
regions is one third of the most two prosperous regions (Aegean and Marmara).38
Living conditions are very poor and unbearable. For example, 2,500 vil-
lages and 8,000 hamlets have been displaced because of security and terrorism.
Moreover, 700 schools in Diyarbakir were closed because of terror and the lack
of will to work in the southeast. Overall, 3,600 schools accommodating nearly
100,000 children have been closed in the region. In 1996, 1.3 million students
competed in entrance exams to universities for 100,000 places. This leaves more
than one million candidates as minor employees and unemployed. The rate of
university entrance in southeastern Anatolia is very low. Both Turkish and
Kurdish youth are frustrated by their future, and extremist messages among these
youths find more acceptance among both Kurdish extremism and Turkish ultra-
nationalism as fundamentalist sentiments become the center of Turkish politics.39
With the help of globalization, mass communication, and transportation,
the Kurds’ relative and absolute deprivation has increased without economic
development in comparison with the Turkish west. As a result, the Kurdish intel-
lectuals have voiced new demands, such as broadcasting in Kurdish, which have
led to the Kurdish ethnonationalist movement. 
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Realist and International Relations Theory
Because traditional Kurdish territories are dispersed among at least four
states – Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria – the Kurdish question cannot always be
contained within the territorial limits of one state. Also, the emergence of an
active Kurdish diaspora, especially in Western Europe, contributes to the inter-
nationalization of the Kurdish question. 
During and after the Cold War, Turkey and Syria had a “strained relation-
ship” because of disputes over Hatay province, water, and terrorism. Water is a
continuing source of conflict for Turkish-Syrian relations and is likely to lead to
serious confrontation in the future when Turkey completes construction of the
GAP project. Syria also has claims on the bordering Turkish province of Hatay.
Syria supported political groups and terrorist organizations in order to use them
against Turkey to balance the water and border issues. Syria allowed PKK bases
in the Bekkaa valley in Lebanon and housed the PKK leader, Ocalan, in
Damascus until Turkish pressure forced Syria to expel Ocalan. Since then, rela-
tions between the two countries have become friendlier. Syria recognizes that the
PKK is a terrorist organization and agrees not to permit any activities that jeop-
ardize the security and stability of Turkey. 
Concerning Kurdish separatism, Iran and Turkey had somewhat converg-
ing interests in preventing an independent Kurdish state. However, Iran has been
seen to be behind Islamic fundamentalism in Turkey, and it sometimes support-
ed PKK activities in Turkey. On the opposite side, Iran was worried that Turkey
and Azerbaijan may be developing a separatist sentiment in Iranian Azerbaijan.
Also, it claims that Turkey supports political and terrorist groups that oppose the
Iranian Revolution. In time, the decline of the threat of Islamic fundamentalism
(political Islam) in Turkey, and moderate and open reformist sentiment in Iran
may create more peaceful and cooperative relations between Iran and Turkey.
But the Axis of Evil discourse has created anxiety in Iran and the nuclear crisis
with the West may have negative spill-over effects onto Turkish-Iran relations
and the Kurdish question in both countries. 
Saddam’s threat to the region was well-known, and Iraq threatened to
attack Turkey if Allied planes continued to use bases in Turkey. During the
1980s, Iraq also supported the PKK. But, despite these conflictual relations, Iraq
shared Turkish and Iranian interests in preventing an independent Kurdish state.
After the Gulf War, Kurdish groups in Iraq took advantage of the Northern Iraqi
power vacuum and established an autonomous Kurdish region.40 During the
post-Saddam period the Kurds in Iraq possessed de facto and de jure autonomy
and federal status in Iraq that may lead to more gains for them, and uncertainty
and unstability for the region. 
Similarly, Greek-Turkish relations have been conflicted with little hope for
normalization. The Cyprus problem and disagreements over the Aegean Sea have
been the traditional points of contention, but the PKK was added as a major issue
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of conflict between the two neighbors. Greek sympathy for Kurdish nationalism
had long been known, but PKK leader Ocalan’s statements about Greek military
and political support created a new crisis between these two neighbors and allies.
However, we have witnessed a new rapprochement and détente between Greece
and Turkey after the 1999 Earthquake.
European governments have accepted that the PKK was a terrorist group
that seriously threatened Turkey’s stability and security. From their point of view,
a destabilized Turkey could expose extremists politics that could endanger
Western interests regarding their politics against Iraq and Iran, as well as the
future of the Middle East peace process. On the other hand, they have pressured
Turkey about its human rights record and a policy change toward the Kurds. In
a similar vein, the United States has been the most supportive Western country
for Turkey’s right to combat PKK terrorism. Decision makers in the United
States still regard Turkey as a country of considerable strategic importance,
viewing Turkey as a relatively stable, pro-Western state that could offer itself as
a useful model for others to imitate, particularly the Turkic states of the former
Soviet Union.41
The perception of dangerous neighbors feeds Turkish paranoia and distrust
about the foreign forces that want to divide Turkey. This Sèvres Syndrome not
only divides people’s attention from the identity-based character of the conflict
but also strengthens the perception of the necessity of a military solution to the
Kurdish question. In short, Ankara blamed external powers – friends and foes
alike – for the emergence of the Kurdish problem. Despite the fact that Turkey
has succeeded in equating the PKK with terrorism in the minds of Americans and
most Europeans, Turkish leaders have refused to engage in a dialogue with mod-
erate Kurdish groups. 
Psychodynamic and Chaos Theories
The ongoing Kurdish question may also be analyzed with the help of psy-
chological approaches as well as complexity and chaos theories and the butterfly
effect, all of which offer novel and interesting ways to analyze the behaviors of
low-intensity conflict systems. In James Gleick’s book, Chaos, he stated that
“Simple systems give rise to complex behavior. Complex systems give rise to
simple behavior.”42 The butterfly effect, extreme sensitivity to initial conditions,
indicates that insignificant variations in the initial starting conditions in the sys-
tem, such as a storm system, have enormous effects on the outcome — the path
and intensity of the storm. Conflict systems have two varieties of chaos: weak
chaos (simple systems with one variable change) and strong chaos (more com-
plex systems with many variable changes over time). When a conflict moves
from latent to manifest conflict processes, weak, uni-dimensional chaos leads to
strong, multi-dimensional chaos making prediction and control difficult, and
uncertainty and instability widespread. In a chaotic conflict system, conflict
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residuals (feedbacks) cause persistent instability where an individual, or group’s
basic human needs, such as ethno-national identity, security, development, and
recognition, are not satisfied and/or the presence of structural violence and rela-
tive deprivation are common phenomenon. Different forces or variables, such as
historic enmity, suitable targets of externalization, projection, displacement, cho-
sen traumas and glories, dehumanization, the egoism of victimization, the need
for enemies and allies, and ethnic identity formation, enters into a simple chao-
tic system that results in very complex and high-dimensional chaos. Many
observers claim that “significant cultural-political and regional differences exist
between Turkish and Iraq Kurds,”43 and more commonalities between Turks and
Kurds in Turkey. The Kurds in the region have “geographical, political, linguis-
tic, tribal and ideological divisions.”44 But the narcissism of minor differences
and shifting of ethnic identities created more Kurdishness among Kurds in the
region and more minor differences among Turks and Kurds in Turkey. Murat
Somer argues that “Kurdish identity is probably still in the making . . ..  Turks
are seen as the primary other are still evolving.”45 Despite the fluidity and uncer-
tainty of identities, BHNs theory suggests the importance of satisfaction of iden-
tity and security needs of the conflicting parties. 
Every unstable environment eventually reaches stability. William
Zartman’s “hurting stalemate”46 indicates that conflict may reach a solution
where all the parties (domestic sources of conflict) as well as the international
system (international sources of conflict) come together in a point where all the
conflict and third parties exhaust all the energy, time, and resources, realize the
failure of contentious tactics, lose social support, and expose unacceptable
costs.47 Following the “hurting stalemate” in 2000, the next step was to move
from conflict settlement (“put the fire out”) to conflict resolution (deal with the
deep-rooted and underlying causes of conflict) and conflict transformation (deal
with long-term relationships among the parties) approaches.48
According to Vamik Volkan, the border between two ethnic groups reveals
rituals that occur between their members. Erecting a psychological border
between the two ethnic groups that prevents each group’s externalizations and
projections from back to the in-group is one ritual.49 When neighbor groups are
not in conflict, physical borders are flexible and large groups reduce their
investment in them. For example, crossing the border between Canada and the
United States is little more than a formality since no threat is involved in mov-
ing from one large group’s territory to the other’s. Under conflict situations, how-
ever, physical borders serve a double duty: they provide practical physical pro-
tection, and they are “psychologized” to represent a symbolic thick skin that pro-
tects large groups from being contaminated.50 When members of large groups
feel that their psychological borders are threatened, they may consider killing
out-group members rather than continue to live under the anxiety. Some mental
borders take the form of a shared mythical belief in a fantasized physical struc-
ture that protects the group, like an invisible wall that keeps dangerous elements
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out. In such a climate, chosen traumas and glories, mourning difficulties, and
feelings of entitlement to revenge are reactivated.51
Volkan52 maintains that human needs determine the group’s friends (allies)
and enemies between in-group/out-group. Thus, human beings possess, an inher-
ent need to have both enemies and allies. Similarly, there is a need to maintain a
border and preserve identity from contamination with enemy images. This psy-
chological mechanism helps us to maintain our separate group identities. We can
see this in any problem-solving workshop. Volkan calls this an “accordion phe-
nomenon.” At first, the group experiences a period of closeness and aligns them-
selves physically and emotionally with the other group (out-group). This illu-
sionary sense of brotherhood breaks down because of the mechanism called
“reaction formation” (unconsciously doing something contrary to one’s true but
hidden wish) and produces a defensive move in which the distance is reestab-
lished. The togetherness becomes too much to tolerate. The extension and con-
traction of the accordion gradually becomes less pronounced and the accordion
keeps playing in lesser degree. The accordion ritual also reflects a need to have
and maintain a border between the antagonists.53 The Kurds and Turks have lived
together and the narcissism of minor differences has worked little in the Kurdish
conflict. Both groups may feel they are different. At the same time, they feel the
same and together. To live in Turkey where territorial integrity and respect for
human rights have been observed has become the common aspirations of both
groups. 
Another psychodynamic process that affects the formation of psychologi-
cal borders between two groups is the concept of chosen traumas and glories. It
refers to an event that invokes in the members of one group intense feelings of
having been humiliated and victimized by members of another group.54 The 11
September events can be labeled as “chosen traumas” for the American public
and policy makers. They have caused traumatic responses and become a part of
collective memory and a syndrome for American people and the world. In the
same way, the Sèvres Syndrome is a chosen trauma for Turks where any radical
and unexpected changes in Turkish internal and foreign policy produce reflexive
reactions and create a static response to the changing world system. 
The Kurdish conflict is psychologically contaminated with shared percep-
tions, thoughts, fantasies, and emotions (both conscious and unconscious) relat-
ed to past historical traumas and glories. It is clear that the psychological
processes live on powerfully in the Kurdish conflict. The Kurds, as a group, psy-
chologically reach back to the Sheikh Said Rebellion as their prime chosen trau-
ma. Every suffering since then is associated with this event in 1925 and its men-
tal representation. Also, the Sèvres Agreement is a chosen trauma for Turks in
which they fear that the survival of Turkey and existence of the Turkish nation
has been threatened by inside and outside enemies. The chosen traumas affect
their international relationships, especially their relationship with the region’s
other countries and the world. Since both groups historically have forged their
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national identities by defining themselves against other groups and not each
other, there is still a possibility that they could learn to live in harmony and
peace.  Further hope is offered by the fact that Turkey has not seen a civil war or
outbreak of violence like Iraq’s. The enemy images of Kurds and Turks are not
fresh enough to create an extensive in-state conflict in Turkey. But the psycho-
logical borders have become more real. The changing regional power structure
and the emergence of an autonomous state in northern Iraq may increase the pos-
sibility of perceived borders between the two groups. 
In 2003, the regime of Saddam Hussein was overthrown in Iraq. The 1
March decision by the Turkish parliament that rejected the deployment of US
troops in Turkey and the involvement of Turkish troops in Iraq created a ripple
effect on US-Turkish-EU relations. Apart from other explanations, the article
suggests that the post-11 September world created an in-group/out-group or “us
versus them” dichotomy. For Turks, they rejected being seen as a “Western” ally
state and may have felt more Muslimness/Turkishness than Western. Despite
cooperation between Turks and Kurds, the Kurdish identity viewed Turks as “the
primary and the enemy other.”55 It is obvious that the changes around Turkey’s
neighbors, especially in Iraq, may have positive or negative spill-over effects on
the Kurdish conflict in Turkey. If Turkey moves toward more democracy, human
and ethnic rights, and conflict resolution, and succeeds with the European Union
process, Turkey and Turkish Kurds could voice the positive changes in northern
Iraq and regional politics, and “become the leader and partner of all regional
Kurds on many issues.”56 Second, resolution of the Kurdish conflict in Turkey
and stabilization of Iraq may open new opportunities for trade, communication,
education, service sector, cultural, economic, and social development. Third, a
non-chaotic, stable Iraq and the comprehensive Middle East peace initiative
could have positive-sum (win-win, non-zero-sum) effects on Turkish-Kurdish
relations, regional cooperation, and new discourses on the Turkish and Kurdish
identity and security needs. 
The negative spill-over effects depend on the escalation of the Kurdish
conflict in Turkey, and the repression and enforcement of assimilation of the
Kurdish population. A “tit-for-tat” approach suggests that the more Kurds
employ violent strategies and tactics, the more Turkey uses “military solution”
methods and vice versa. In this case, the complex and chaotic character of the
conflict will increase with the establishment of Kurdish statehood in Iraq and
polarization among Turks, Kurds, Arabs, Turkmen, and others. Despite the mutu-
al interdependence of the Turkish state and the Kurdish entity in Iraq, the lack of
trust based on the divide-and-rule policies of Turks, Persians, Arabs, the British,
and Americans may re-kindle pan-Turkish, pan-Kurdish, and pan-Arab national-
ists, and eliminate the moderates in favor of security and economic survival. The
extreme positions of all sides may jeopardize Turkey’s democratization and EU
integration. The removal of stable psychological borders and the construction of
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new identities could intensify the negative spill-over effects of the new Kurdish
entities in the region. 
COMMON GROUND BETWEEN TURKS AND KURDS:
THE INTERACTIVE PROBLEM-SOLVING APPROACH
Many methods, techniques, and practical initiatives for the de-escalation,
transformation, and resolution of intergroup conflict exist within the conflict res-
olution field. Among these methods are informal, non-directive workshops that
bring members of conflicting parties together in face-to-face, small group, prob-
lem-solving discussions moderated or facilitated by informal panels of outside
consultants to help participants understand and resolve their conflicts. One of the
intervention techniques used for the Kurdish question was “interactive problem-
solving workshops (PSWs).”57 This approach was first introduced by John
Burton in 1969. Since then, conflict resolution practitioners have held many
PSWs between Israelis-Palestinians, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and Russians
and Baltic republics’ participants. 
The main focus in PSWs is to change the perception between the conflict-
ing parties so that these interactions transform the political debate and decision-
making processes in the two communities. These workshops may foster a better
understanding of the other’s perspective and change the image of the other side.
Another result is that participants may understand there is someone to talk to and
something to talk about. 
In order to find a lasting and peaceful solution of the Kurdish question, a
group of Turkish and Kurdish citizens decided to organize confidential problem-
solving workshops under the auspices of the Peace Research Institute of Oslo
(PRIO) and European Center for Common Ground (ECCG) in 1996. The meet-
ings were facilitated by William Ury and were held in three neutral international
locations:  France, Switzerland, and Belgium. The participants consisted of 14
prominent Kurds and Turks,58 who engaged in intensive, informal, and interac-
tive discussions. They also agreed to three basic premises:
• first, that democracy is desirable;
• second, violence is counterproductive; and,
• third, any solution must safeguard the territorial integrity of Turkey.59
During the PSWs, Kurdish and Turkish participants engaged in the process
of a “walk through history.”60 At the end of this process, the participants agreed
on “a set of principles for peaceful co-existence as the citizens of the same coun-
try and polity.”61 Also, they launched a “peace partnership project” which sought
to facilitate public debate and generate support for the non-violent resolution of
the Kurdish question. As a result of these activities, they established a new non-
governmental organization (NGO) in Ankara, the Foundation for the Research of
Social Problems (TOSAV).62 During the last couple of years, TOSAV’s main
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objectives have been highlighted in “the Document of Mutual Understanding.”63
In this document, they proposed a new constitutional framework and order for
the resolution of the Kurdish question, and the democratization of Turkey. It sug-
gested reforms in political and institutional, cultural and educational, legislative
and judicial, and security and economic areas. 
Apart from the existent deadlocked initiative, the PSWs and conflict reso-
lution technique aimed to change attitudes, perceptions, and ideas for resolving
the conflict among the individual participants in the workshop, and transfer these
changes into the political arena, i.e. political debate and the decision-making
process within each community. This conflict resolution technique made great
contributions to peace making and resolution of the Kurdish question.
CONCLUSION
The Kurdish question in Turkey is a highly complex, controversial, and
extremely politically sensitive issue. And because of its inter-state nature devel-
opments in northern Iraq are also causing additional complications for Turkish
decision makers. Moreover, the international community’s reaction has been per-
ceived as interference in Turkey’s internal affairs. Within the psychological
realm Turkish policy makers still live in the state of the “Sèvres Syndrome.” As
President Demirel publicly announced, Western appeals for Turkey to grant
minority rights and open up a dialogue with the Kurds could lead to a situation
worse than that envisaged by the Treaty of Sèvres. He warned of the danger of
Turkey slipping toward a situation resembling that of a bloodbath in Bosnia and
former Yugoslavia.64 The stress on linkage between Sèvres, “concessions” to the
Kurds and the views of the West may create polarization within Turkish society.
Also, it is a complex issue to define who the Kurds are. M. Van Bruissen
argued that the Kurds within Turkey might feel that they have multiple identities.
For example, a Sunni Zaza speaker may be a Zaza, a Kurd, a Sunni Muslim, a
citizen of Turkey (or a Turk), the member of a certain social class, tribe, or vil-
lage, depending on the particular context.65
What makes everything more complicated is that the religious and funda-
mental movements and ethnic Islam have become more influential in the areas
where the Kurdish majority live.66 In her analysis, Lale Yalcin-Heckermann con-
cluded that the Kurdish question in Turkey will depend on these two fundamen-
tal forces: nationalism and Islam.67 Because of the need to preserve differences
and describe one group’s members from another, it is more effective to make bor-
ders flexible, accessible, and negotiable than to remove them. The late Egyptian
president, Anwar Sadat, saw the psychological barrier between Egyptians and
Israelis as a problem that needed to be removed. Although the barrier certainly
was an obstacle on the path to peace, removing it entirely would have caused fur-
ther complications because a sense of shared identity without a border induces
aggression, as each group tries to recover its individual identity.  The resolution
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of the Kurdish conflict may require the creation of a new shared identity
(European) and/or the re-definition of a common identity (Turkishness) for the
maintenance of healthy psychological borders. 
There is no easy answer or panacea for the Kurdish question in Turkey. In
1993, Turkish Prime Minister Tansu Ciller briefly referred to a possible Basque
model of regional autonomy in the case of the Kurds in Turkey.68 In early 1995,
she made a speech that energized some debates about the Kurdish issue. She
declared that “Happy is one who can say one is a citizen of Turkey.”69
Unfortunately, there has been more violence and bloodshed in Turkey because of
the complex nature of the Kurdish question. Kirisci and  Winrow saw the possi-
ble solution if Turkey moves toward further “democratization and devolution of
decision-making powers, the development of a dialogue, and the possible emer-
gence of multiculturalism based on a real and genuine civic nationalism.”70
Similarly, Henri Barkey and Graham Fuller offered more improvement, reform,
and modernization in democratic structures. If there is no urgent solution to the
Kurdish problem, Turkey could be “dragg[ed] into a broadened civil war, eco-
nomic weakness, domestic terror, polarization, chauvinism, and curtailment of
democratic liberties.”71 In a similar vein, TOSAV’s document of mutual under-
standing suggested that economic development, multi-culturalism, and demo-
cratic pluralism may ease ethnic and religious tensions.72 In his article, Hakan
Yavuz argued that common identities, such as Islam and citizenship within a
democratic environment, can help to manage ethnic conflicts in multi-ethnic
states. He stated that “Turkey’s Kurdish problem can be addressed only if Turkey
creates a civil society that functions as a repository of multiple identities and
builds necessary political institutions to negotiate and navigate the interaction
among these identities.”73
After recent developments, there may be hope for a possible peaceful solu-
tion of the Kurdish question. The capture of PKK’s leader may eliminate the
monopoly of hardliners and radicals on the Kurdish side. On the other hand, the
domestic and international pressure on Turkey for more democratization, peace-
ful coexistence, and respect of human rights may create positive effects not only
with the Kurdish question but also for Turkish society. In this new environment,
both side’s moves toward a solution ebbs and flows. For example, the HADEP,
the succeeding party acting in the name of Kurdish ethnic and democratic claims,
won many municipalities in the 1999 election and has moved toward a greater
role for democratic political participation and representation. However, many
people still suffer because of the infamous article 312 in the Turkish penal code
when they voice their concerns about the Kurdish question and political Islam in
Turkey. 
Like many low-intensity conflicts, the Kurdish conflict in Turkey is
dynamic, chaotic, complex, and unstable, as well as having escalatory and de-
escalatory phases. Conflict intervention has so far employed realpolitik tools,
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such as army and police actions. However, the chaotic and complex conflict sys-
tems require multi-dimensional and multi-track conflict intervention methods
that include all major stakeholders and focus on underlying basic human needs
and structural violence. It is vital to address the security issue of all parties that
is necessary to build trust with the other side. The goal of terrorism is not to
defeat the other party but to destabilize the region and bring about the loss of
governmental control. Intervention must provide prediction and control in the
conflict system, and move from manifest conflict to negative peace, and from
negative peace to positive peace. Also, conflict resolution has to begin with the
neighborhood level (mahalle) and extend to the local community (semt), city,
province, southeastern region, Turkey, and the Middle East. Also, perpetual
peace requires a “paradigm shift” to move people away from the attractors of
violence toward the attractors of peaceful solutions. 
In my opinion, there is still hope for a solution to the Kurdish question
within Turkish democratic institutions, the preservation of the territorial integri-
ty of Turkey, and the recognition of the Kurdish identity. 
Endnotes
1. Mesut Yegen, “The Kurdish question in Turkish state discourse,” Journal of  Contemporary
History 34, no. 4 (October 1999), pp. 555-68.
2. Robert Olson, “The Kurdish question and Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syria, Iran, Russia
and Iraq since the Gulf War,” in Robert Olson, ed., The Kurdish Nationalist Movement in the
1990s: Its impact on Turkey and the Middle East (Lexington, KY: The University Press of
Kentucky, 1996), p. 84.
3. David McDowall, A Modern History of the Kurds (New York: I.B. Taurus, 1996), p. 32.
4. Server Mutlu, “Population of Turkey by ethnic groups and provinces,” New Perspectives on
Turkey no. 12 (Spring 1995), pp. 517-41.
5. As a matter of fact, the largest Kurdish-populated city in the world is Istanbul, which exceeds
the number of Kurds in Diyarbakir.
6. McDowall, A Modern History, pp. 2-13.
7. The millet system was a form of communal self-government. In the Ottoman Empire, one’s
identity derived from one’s religion. Non-Muslim communities were institutionalized in accor-
dance with religion and allowed to govern themselves, although they were responsible to the
Ottoman government. 
8. An Agha means feudal lords, and a Sheikh refers to religious leader. 
9. McDowall, A Modern History, p. 17.
10. Some authors found some overlaps between the Ottoman Hamidiye regiments and the village-
guard system in 1980s. For him, both of them have a role to discipline the nomadic people of
the region and maintain the loyalty of Kurdish tribes to the central authority. Kemal Kirisci and
Gareth M. Winrow, The Kurdish Question: An Example of a Trans-state Ethnic Conflict
(London: Frank Cass, 1997), p. 129. 
11. McDowall, A Modern History, p. 17.
12. See Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds in Turkey: A Political Dilemma (Boulder, CO: Westview,
1990); and Michael M. Gunter, The Kurds and the Future of Turkey (New York: St. Martin’s,
1997).
The Journal of Conflict Studies
151
13. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, p. 101.
14. During the PSWs between Kurdish and Turkish intellectuals, one of the Kurdish participants
told a very sad and emotional story about the Dersim revolt and its results. Afterwards, one of
the Turkish participants told the group that he did not know this side of history. Interview with
Dr. Dogu Ergil, 1 March 2000, Washington, DC, at  http://www.sfcg.org/tosavm.htm.
15. Gulistan Gurbey, “The development of the Kurdish Nationalism movement in Turkey since the
1980s,” in Olson, ed., The Kurdish nationalist movement in the 1990s, p.13. Michael Gunter
explained the origin of word “Mountain Turks” in a sarcastic manner: “Indeed, the very word
‘Kurd’ was said to be nothing more than a corruption of the crunching sound (kirt, kart, or kurt)
one made while walking through the snow-covered mountains in the southeast. The much
abused and criticized appellation ‘Mountain Kurd’ when referring to the Turkish Kurds served
as a code term for these actions.” Gunter, The Kurds, p. 6. 
16. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, 1997, p. 108.
17. Hamit Bozarslan, “Political aspects of the Kurdish problem in contemporary Turkey,” in Philip
G. Kreyenbroek, ed., The Kurds: Contemporary Overview (New York: Routledge, 1992), pp.
99-100.
18. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, “Turkey’s Kurdish question: Critical turning points and
missed opportunities,” Middle East Journal 51, no.1 (Winter 1997), pp. 66-67.
19. Henri J. Barkey and Graham E. Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question (Boulder, CO: Rowman and
Littlefield, 1998), p. 25.  
20. For comprehensive information about civilian, PKK, and security force casualties between
1984 and 1995, see Table 5.6 in Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, p. 126.
21. Most analysts believe that 70 percent inflation and 20 percent unemployment rates in Turkey
are the result of the huge military spending during the Kurdish insurgence. Olson estimated that
Turkey’s war against the Kurds cost them $6 billion. Olson, “The Kurdish question and
Turkey’s foreign policy toward Syria, Iran, Russia and Iraq since the Gulf War,” p. 101. The
total deployment of Turkish troops and security forces reached 300,000; that includes regular
troops, police, special forces, village guards, and gendarme. Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s
Kurdish Question, p. 152. Apparently, approximately one-quarter of the total manpower of
NATO’s second-largest army was deployed in the area against the PKK. 
22. At http://www.euractiv.com/en/enlargement/eu-turkey-relations/article-129678.
23. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, p. 89.
24. Yegen, “The Kurdish question in Turkish state discourse,” p. 555.
25. Dennis J.D. Sandole, Capturing the Complexity of Conflict: Dealing with Violent Ethnic
Conflicts of the post-Cold War Era (New York: Cassell Academic Publishers, 1999), p. 109.
26. In this book, Sandole defines conflict-as-process as negative self-fulfilling prophecies (NSFPs).
NSFPs are both self-stimulating/self-perpetuating conflict processes (initiating, escalation, con-
trolled maintenance, etc.) as well as action-reaction processes. In CR, conflict-as-process is
where third parties enter the scene. 
27. Ibid., p. 129.
28. Martin Hollis, The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction (New York: Cambridge
University Press), 1994.
29. John Burton, “Human needs theory,” in John Burton, ed., Conflict: Resolution and Prevention
(New York: St. Martin’s, 1990), pp. 36-37.  
30. Ibid.; Johan Galtung “International development in human perspective,” in John Burton, ed.,
Conflict: Human Needs Theory (London: MacMillan, 1990). 
31. Johan Galtung, “International development,” p. 309.
32. Ted Robert Gurr and Barbara Harff, Ethnic Conflicts in World Politics (Boulder, CO: Westview,
1994), p. 30.
Winter 2006
152
33. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, claim that there is no unified language and religion
among the Kurds. Similarly, Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, emphasize the
Kirmanji and Zaza as two different Kurdish dialects, and Sunni and Alevi as two different
Islamic faiths. 
34. Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines: From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism (New York: Westview,
1998). 
35. Dennis J.D. Sandole, “Paradigms, theories, metaphors in conflict and conflict resolution:
Coherence or confusion?” in Dennis J.D. Sandole and Hugo van der Merwe, eds., Conflict
Resolution Theory and Practice: Integration and Application (New York: Manchester
University Press, 1993), pp. 11-12.
36. Ibid., p. 11.
37. Ibid., p. 12. See Ted Robert Gurr, Why Men Rebel (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press,
1970).
38. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, pp. 122-23.
39. Interestingly, PKK terrorists are mostly recruited from teenagers. Also, the rise of ultra-nation-
alist and religious parties is the result of this vicious cycle of terrorism and economic depriva-
tion.  The Nationalist People’s Party (NPP) became the second party in the 1999 election. One
of its slogans was “Hang Ocalan.”
40. Nur Bilge Criss, “The nature of PKK terrorism in Turkey,” Studies of Conflict and Terrorism
18 (1995), pp. 17-37. 
41. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, p. 177.
42. James Gleick, Chaos: Making a New Science (New York: Viking Penguin, 1987), p. 304.
43. Murat Somer, “Failures of the Discourse of Ethnicity: Turkey, the Kurds, and the Emerging
Iraq,” Security Dialogue 36, no.1 (March 2005), p. 114.
44. Ibid., p. 116.
45. Ibid., p. 117.
46. William I. Zartman, “Ripeness: The Hurting Stalemate and Beyond,” in Paul C. Stern and
Daniel Druckman, eds., International Conflict Resolution after the Cold War (Washington, DC:
National Academy Press, September 2000).
47. J.Z. Rubin, D.G. Pruitt, and S.H. Kim, Social Conflict: Escalation, Stalemate, and Settlement
(New York: McGraw Hill, 1994).
48. Sandole, Capturing the Complexity of Conflict.
49. Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies: From Clinical Practice to
International Relationships (Northvale, NJ: Jason Aronson, 1988); Marc H. Ross,
“Psychocultural Interpretation Theory and Peacemaking in Ethnic Conflicts,” Political
Psychology 16, no. 3 (1995), pp. 523-44; Ronald J. Fisher, Interactive Conflict Resolution
(Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1997).
50. Volkan, Bloodlines, p. 105.
51. Vamik D. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies; Vamik D. Volkan “Psychoanalytic
Aspects of Ethnic Conflict,” in Joseph V. Montville, Conflict and Peacemaking in Multiethnic
Societies (Lanham, MD: Lexington Books,1990), pp. 81-93.
52. Volkan, The Need to Have Enemies and Allies.
53. Volkan, Bloodlines, p. 102; Fisher, Interactive Conflict, p. 111.
54. Vamik D. Volkan and Norton Itzkowitz, Turks and Greeks: Neighbors in Conflict
(Cambridgeshire, UK: Eothen Press, 1994), p. 7.
55. Somer, “Failures,” p. 114.
56. Ibid., p. 182.  
The Journal of Conflict Studies
153
57. Herbert C. Kelman, “The Interactive Problem-Solving Approach,” in Chester A. Crocker, et al.,
Managing Global Chaos: Sources of and Responses to International Conflict (Washington, DC:
USIP, 1996).
58. The participants are selected from different background and professions. They are from the mil-
itary, political, cultural, and media realms of the decision-making apparatus. PSWs had seven
Turk and seven Kurd participants. There were also seven domestic PSWs in Turkish cities.
They were held in Van, Diyarbakir, Mersin, Ankara, Izmir, and Istanbul with 100-200 partici-
pants. 
59. Interview with Dr. Dogu Ergil.
60. Joseph Montville, “The psychological burdens of history,” unpublished material (1999), p. 3.
61. At http://www.tosav.org.tr/common.htm or http://www.tosam.org/english.html.
62. TOSAV are the Turkish initials for the new NGOs. TOSAV was established in April 1997 and
received a great attention from both Turkish and Kurdish intellectuals, artists, public opinion
leaders, as well as the diplomatic corps.
63. For an English version of the document, see http://www.tosav.org.tr/common.htm.
64. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, p. 210.
65. M. Van Bruinessen, “Kurdish society, ethnicity, nationalism, and the refugee problem,” in P.G.
Kreyenbroek and S. Sperl, eds., The Kurds: A Contemporary Overview (New York and London:
Routledge, 1992), p. 47.
66. Burhanettin Duran, “Approaching the Kurdish question via Adil Duzen: An Islamist formula of
the Welfare Party for ethnic coexistence,” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 18, no.1 (April
1998), pp. 111-28.  
67. Lale Yalcin-Heckermann, “Ethnic Islam and nationalism among the Kurds in Turkey,” in
Richard Tapper, ed., Islam in Modern Turkey: Religion, Politics and Literature in a Secular
State (London: I.B. Tauris, 1991), p. 102.
68. Turkish Daily News [TDN], 13 October 1993.
69. TDN, 4 January 1995.
70. Kirisci and Winrow, The Kurdish Question, p. 214.
71. Barkey and Fuller, Turkey’s Kurdish Question, p. 223.
72. For the entire text, see http://www.tosav.org.tr/common.htm.
73. Hakan M. Yavuz, “A preamble to the Kurdish question: The politics of Kurdish Identity,”
Journal of Muslim Affairs 18 (April 1998), p. 17.
